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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTCO ASSOCIATES, LTD., a Utah 
limited partnership, by and 
through its general partner, 
Robert D. Kent, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
K. DEMARR ZIMMERMAN; SUMERSET 
HOUSEBOATS, DIV. SMI; and 
JAMES E. SHARPE, JOHN DOES 
1-10, 
Appellees-
Cross Appellants-Defendants. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, District Judge 
L INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, plaintiff and appellant UTCO 
Associates, Ltd. ("UTCO") replies to those new issues raised by defendants and appellees James E. 
Sharpe ("Sharpe") and Sumerset Houseboats, Div. SMI ("Sumerset") in their Brief of Appellees 
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930904174 
Argument Priority 15 
("Defendants' Brief).1 Sharpe has utterly failed to address certain arguments contained in UTCO's 
initial brief. First, Sharpe has failed to cite any Utah case which distinguishes the cases cited by 
UTCO demonstrating that promissory estoppel is a legal claim under which damages are awarded. 
UTCO's Brief of Appellant ("UTCO's Brief) at 11-16. Further, Sharpe failed to cite any evidence 
to refute the jury's finding that there was no contract. UTCO's Brief at 16-18. Accordingly, these 
issues need not be discussed by UTCO in this brief as Sharpe and Sumerset have conceded these 
arguments. 
IL THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUSLY FOUND THAT UTCO HAD AN 
ADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW BECAUSE OF UTCO'S BREACH OF 
CONTRACT AND MTSREPRESENTATION CLAIMS SUBMITTED TO THE 
JURYT NOT UTCO'S PENDING BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING AGAINST 
ZIMMERMAN AS ASSERTED BY SHARPE. 
Sharpe and Sumerset claim that UTCO's remedy at law was "its claim filed in Mr. 
Zimmerman's bankruptcy". Defendants' Brief at 17. Sharpe alleges the claims asserted in 
Zimmerman's bankruptcy were the adequate remedy at law referred to by the trial court when it 
refused to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim. Sharpe argues that because the 
claims in Zimmerman's bankruptcy were referred to in Sharpe's Motion for Directed Verdict,2 then 
those bankruptcy claims must have been the "adequate remedy at law" for the trial court's refusal 
Sharpe and Sumerset are sometimes collectively referred to as "Sharpe" based in part on the fact that the only 
contact which UTCO had with Sumerset was through Sharpe. 
It is undisputed that this remedy involved Zimmerman exclusively and did not include UTCO's claims against 
Sumerset and Sharpe for breach of their promise to ship the Houseboat to Utah after receiving the Funds from 
plaintiff. Sharpe and Sumerset argued repeatedly that UTCO's exclusive remedy was to assert claims against 
Zimmerman in the Zimmerman bankruptcy proceeding. R. 2400-01. The trial court flatly rejected this argument, 
when it was presented in Sharpe and Sumerset's Motion for Directed Verdict, and stated the essence of plaintiff s 
claim against Sharpe and Sumerset. R. 2396-97. 
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to instruct the jury on UTCO's promissory estoppel claim. Defendants' Brief at 8, 16. However, 
the trial court denied the Motion for Directed Verdict, R. 2416, and allowed plaintiff to continue 
presenting evidence in support of the promissory estoppel claim. Further, defendant continued to 
defend the promissory estoppel claim until the close of the evidence when the trial court sua sponte 
dismissed plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim at the close of all of the evidence, five days after the 
Motion for Directed Verdict was denied, R. 2416.3 
The trial court did not refer at all to the Zimmerman bankruptcy when it gave the reasons for 
its refusal to instruct the jury on the promissory estoppel claim. R. 2606-07. Indeed, the trial court's 
stated basis for dismissing the promissory estoppel claim was because it was "surplusage" and "that 
the concept of promissory estoppel basically mirrors the causes of action that are being asserted in 
this case by the plaintiff. And they'll just be surplusage." R.2606-07. Emphases added. The 
causes of action asserted by plaintiff "in this case" cannot include the claims in the Zimmerman 
bankruptcy as argued by Sharpe and Sumerset. Instead, the causes of action asserted in this case are 
for breach of contract against Sumerset and Sharpe as plaintiff alleged in its Brief. See UTCO Brief 
at 16-18. Accordingly, the "adequate remedy at law" referred to by the trial court was for 
defendants' breach of their contract with UTCO, not a claim asserted in a separate action in 
Zimmerman's bankruptcy. Because the jury concluded that there was no contract between UTCO 
and Sharpe as stated on the Special Verdict Form, R. 1672, the trial court erred when it concluded 
that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, UTCO's breach of contract claim. 
The cases cited by Sharpe in support of the argument that UTCO had an adequate remedy 
The argument on Defendants' motion for directed verdict is found in the record at R.2389-2416. 
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at law are distinguishable and inapposite.4 Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 1097 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
involved a case involving a claim for quantum meruit, not promissory estoppel. Further, the Court 
found that plaintiff had failed to exhaust two legal remedies. The first legal remedy that plaintiff 
failed to exhaust in Knight was for foreclosure a mechanics' lien which lien was never perfected, 748 
P.2d at 1100. UTCO did not fail to pursue any claim against any defendant to this action either in 
the Zimmerman bankruptcy or in this case.5 
The second legal remedy that plaintiff failed to pursue in Knight was pursuit of the 
corporation's assets as a creditor in the corporation's bankruptcy proceeding. Id. However, this 
Court noted "that the corporation's bankruptcy action did not necessarily preclude recovery under 
a properly filed mechanics' lien nor did it toll the requirement of bringing an action to enforce such 
&lkn within the statutory twelve month period." 748 P.2d at 1100, n.2 (citing Munson v. Risinger, 
114 So.2d 59, 61 (La.Ct.App.1959)). 
In the present case, UTCO was required to pursue its claims against Sumerset and Sharpe 
separately despite the filing of the Zimmerman bankruptcy because, in the words of Knight, the 
Defendants also argue that "A primary basis for declining to instruct the jury on this claim . . . mirrors the chief 
basis upon which the Motion for Directed Verdict on the promissory estoppel claim was made by Sumerset and Mr. 
Sharpe." Defendants' Brief at 16 (emphasis added). The Court should note that the "chief basis for defendants' 
motion was an alleged lack of reliance. R. 1573-75. 
Further, Sharpe claims that plaintiff presented no evidence that showed that UTCO's pursuit of claims in the 
bankruptcy was fruitless as allegedly required under Knight. However, defendants' expert admitted that recovery of 
funds by UTCO was speculative because he did "not believe that there is any way to predict the percentage [of the 
estate which UTCO may receive." R.2447. Further under Knight the Court held that the defendant "should not be 
held liable as a consequence of Knight's failure to successfully assert his legal rights. As in Commercial Fixtures, 
Knight has failed to exhaust his legal remedies, so may not recover on the basis of quantum meruit." Knight, 748 
P.2d at 1100 (Citing t Jtschig v. McClone: 114 N.W.2d 854 (Wis. 1962)(emphasis added). Accordingly, Knight is 
further distinguishable from the present case because the plaintiff failed to assert legal rights in a quantum meruit 
aciion which rights were then lost by plaintiff. As shown infra, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that actions 
against third parties must be filed within the appropriate statute of limitations for such actions. 
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Zimmerman bankruptcy did not "toll the requirement of bringing an action" against Sharpe and 
Sumerset. UTCO filed its claims against all appropriate entities and therefore, met the requirements 
ofKnight 
Sharpe and Sumerset also cite Commercial Fixtures and Furnishing v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 
774 (Utah 1977), for the proposition that exhaustion of remedies is required before equitable relief 
can be pursued. Defendants' Brief at 17. In Commercial Fixtures, a supplier of materials brought 
an action seeking recovery for the value of materials used to improve leased premises at the request 
of the tenant. The supplier sued the landlord, not the tenant, on a theory of unjust enrichment, not 
promissory estoppel. Like Knight, Commercial Fixtures is a quantum meruit case, not a promissory 
estoppel case. Sharpe and Sumerset argue the point of Commercial Fixtures that, where there is an 
express contract between a supplier and a lessee, an agreement between the supplier and the landlord 
will not be implied. S££ Defendants' Brief at 21. However, Sharpe and Sumerset failed to cite 
crucial language in the paragraph immediately preceding the quote cited to this Court. Id. The Utah 
Supreme Court concluded: 
The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contract between two others does 
not make such third person liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution. 
See 66 Am Jur.2d 960. There must be some misleading act, request for services, or 
the like, to support such an action. 
564 P.2d at 774. In the present action, there were several "misleading acts" and "requests for 
services and the like" to support UTCO's claims against defendants under the promissory estoppel 
theory. Indeed, the trial court summarized these actions in the argument on the Motion for Directed 
Verdict which was denied because of these very acts of defendants: 
The Court: But, Mr. Atkin, Mr. Nelson, in his trust account, had Mr. 
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Zimmerman's money. And that money came from a loan from UTCQ, And part of 
the deal between Zimmerman and UTCQ was that they [UTCO] would get a lien on 
this property. 
Now assuming for the sake of discussion, which, of course, we must do, that 
the testimony that's been offered that Mr. Sharpe said, you send me the money, I will 
ship you that boat, and the interest of the boat was going to be shipped immediately. 
It is not the money, it's the loss of the security interest. 
The Court: Mr. Nelson, wasn't told this boat wasn't built, according to 
him. And that is the evidence to this point in time. 
Mr.Atkin: Wel l -
The Court: He thought the boat was built. He thought that as soon as the 
money got there they were going to put the boat on the truck and drive it here. 
R. 2396-97. 
Sharpe and Sumerset then argue that plaintiff had suffered no damage because the money 
sent by UTCO to Sharpe was Zimmerman's. The trial court also flatly rejected Sharpe's and 
Sumerset's claims that plaintiff suffered no damage as a result of the misrepresentations of Sharpe 
and Sumerset: 
The Court: Mr. Atkin, what do you do, maybe I'm misguided here, but if 
someone makes you a promise and you do something in that regard to that promise, 
even shipping someone else's money, wiring somebody else's money, and that 
person doesn't do what they say they're going to do, it seems to me there's 
something wrong with that. 
Mr. Atkin: Well, there has to be — there has to be damages, your honor. 
There has to be a change of position by the plaintiff that would have caused damage 
or detriment to the plaintiff. And there just isn't any in this case. 
- 6 -
The Court: So that's your theory, there is no damages here? So Mr. 
Sharpe, in this case, if that's the evidence, at this point in time, it's that he made an 
intentional misrepresentation about shipping the boat immediately, that he hadn't 
even built, and that's just too bad. Is that the way we do business in this country? 
Mr. Atkin: Well, your honor, we have to look at who has standing to 
complain. And that's Mr. Zimmerman, who might have had some standing to 
complain. 
The Court: He didn't make a promise to Mr. Zimmerman, he made it to 
Mr. Nelson. Mr. Nelson is the guy that had the money in his trust account, and he 
is the guy that decided whether the fifty-eight thousand was going to be sent. And 
I don't believe for a minute Mr. Nelson would have sent it but for the fact that he got 
a promise that there was a boat there to be shipped. There wasn't even a boat built. 
R. 2401-2403; s££ als£ R. 563, 641, 2095, 2091-93, 2196-99, 2278-79, 2077. Accordingly, under 
Commercial Fixtures, there was a "misleading act" and a "request for services or the like" which 
allows an independent action to be brought against Sharpe and Sumerset. S££ alsQ UTCO's Brief 
at 11-20. 
IIL UTCQ RELIED ON THE MISREPRESENTATIONS OF SHARPE AND 
SUMERSET. 
Reliance is one of the elements of the claim for promissory estoppel. Incredibly, defendants 
claim that UTCO never relied on the representations of Sharpe and Sumerset. Defendants' Brief at 
21-24. Sharpe and Sumerset ask this Court to infer that the trial court found that any reliance by 
UTCO was insufficient as a matter of law. However, the trial court made no such statement. R. 
2606-07. The record containing the trial court's decisions and rationale are devoid of such an 
important ruling. R.2606-07. Further, Mr. Nelson testified unequivocally that UTCO would never 
have loaned the money if it did not believe that Sharpe and Sumerset would not ship the Houseboat 
upon receipt of the Funds from UTCO: 
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Mr. Nelson: After we talked about those three things I then confirmed with 
him that if I would wire $58,384.00 that he would then ship the houseboat, as was 
our discussion. And he said yes. 
Q. That's important. You're very certain he said that to you? 
A. I'm as certain as I'm sitting here. And I was shocked when I heard 
him say today the conversation never took place. I would have never wired the 
money, which I did, and he received. I would have never wired the money if he 
hadn't agreed to what we just talked about. 
R. 2198-99. 
Nelson also confirmed that part of the deal with Zimmerman was to obtain a loan whereby 
UTCO would obtain an invoice, registration for the Houseboat (MSO) and wiring instructions from 
Sumerset as it had done four times before. R. 2195-97, 2278-79. Sharpe and Sumerset now 
erroneously claim: "Thus, the undisputed evidence established that UTCO's decision to loan $60,000 
to Mr. Zimmerman and the loan itself occurred before the alleged promise." Defendants' Brief at 
23. However, Mr. Nelson testified that he received the invoice and MSO describing the Houseboat 
and wiring instructions for the Funds to be sent by UTCO to Sharpe from Sharpe on December 1, 
which was prior to the closing of the loan on December 21. R. 2195, Exhibits 7-9. Further, the 
MSO and invoice were sent by Sharpe so that UTCO could accurately describe the Houseboat in its 
loan documents with Zimmerman. R. 2184-85. Finally, Mr. Nelson testified that the parties had 
previously done business on three other occasions where UTCO received a security interest in the 
houseboats and then Sumerset sent the houseboats. R. 2196, 2278-79. UTCO's decision to loan the 
Funds at issue was based upon its course of dealing with Sharpe and Sumerset, its receipt of 
documents from Sharpe describing the Houseboat which Sharpe represented he would send to Lake 
Powell after receipt of the Funds from UTCO and upon conversations with Mr. Sharpe wherein he 
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confirmed that he would send the boat after the loan closed and the funds were sent. Sse alsQ 
UTCO's Brief at 18-20; seealsQ R. 563,641,2095,2091-93,2196-99,2278-79,2077. UTCO's 
decision was not based solely on the conversation which Nelson had with Sharpe after Zimmerman 
executed the loan documents as Sharpe claims. There was ample evidence of reliance to support 
UTCO's promissory estoppel claims. 
Finally, Sharpe and Sumerset claim that because UTCO had loaned the money to 
Zimmerman, it had no interest in the funds wired and therefore, UTCO suffered no damage. As 
stated above, under its agreement with Zimmerman, UTCO was to receive a $58,384 security 
interest in the Houseboat. Sharpe's promise did in fact induce action or forbearance by UTCO from 
which a detriment was suffered. Indeed, Sharpe admitted that his promise induced UTCO to send 
funds on or about December 29, 1992 to Sumerset.6 R. 2060-62, 2092-93. Sharpe testified that he 
had a "little trail going" or "course of dealing" with UTCO whereby UTCO would send money to 
. obtain an interest in a boat which had been or would be shipped by defendants to Utah. R.2092-93. 
Sharpe further admitted that he never told Nelson that he was going to apply the payment of $58,384 
to the amount Zimmerman owed Sharpe on another boat. R. 2077. Sharpe also testified that when 
he was sending MSOs to Nelson he understood that Nelson "would be using that as collateral on the 
boat" and that the MSO was required to license the boat in another state. R.2095. Finally, Sharpe 
admitted that the boat described in the MSO and other documents sent to Nelson "was never 
manufactured by Sumerset." R.2097-98. Sharpe testified under cross-examination that he had 
admitted in his answers to interrogatories that the $58,384 was applied the same day it was received 
6Record at 2060-61, 2092-93. 
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to the other boat. R.2148-50. Nelson testified that he called Sharpe on numerous occasions and 
verified that if UTCO sent $58,384.00, Sharpe would send a boat described in the MSO and other 
documents that Sharpe had previously sent to Nelson. R.2196-99. Upon receiving Mr. Sharpe's 
assurances that a boat would be sent upon receipt of the $58,384, Mr. Nelson sent the money to 
Sumerset. R. 2199-2202. Nelson testified that he found out that the boat bearing the serial number 
on the MSO sent to Nelson had been sold to another person. R.2210-11.7 In sum, UTCO presented 
adequate evidence in support of its promissory estoppel claim.8 
IY* DEFENDANTS FAIT, TO ADDRESS OR FHSTINGUTSH THE CASE LAW 
CITED BY UTCO WHICH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED WHEN IT EXCLUDED EVIDENCE THAT SHARPE CHANGED 
SERIAL NUMBERS ON BOATS AND SOLD THE BOAT TO ANOTHER 
PARTY. 
Defendants failed to distinguish UTCO's case law which demonstrate that the Court should 
look to all of the surrounding circumstances in a fraud action to allow the plaintiff to show the 
fraudulent intent of the defendants. S££ UTCO Brief at 22-24. Defendants have merely stated that 
the Court has discretion in making evidentiary rulings and that all relevant evidence was presented. 
7See Zions First Nat 7 Bank v. Rocky Mtn. Irr. Inc., 795 P.2d 658, 663-64 (Utah 1990)("Our rules of civil 
procedure require, that the pleadings be conformed to the evidence presented at trial when no objection is made to 
the introduction of such evidence. Utah R.Civ.P. 15(b); s_££ Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97 (Utah 1983) 
(mandatory for trial court to grant leave to amend to conform to evidence); General Ins. Co. v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 505-06 (Utah 1976) (failure to object to evidence outside scope of pleadings is implied 
consent to try issue raised by such evidence). The trial court has no discretion to deny such an amendment. 
General Ins. Co., 545 P.2d at 506. By not giving the proposed instructions on common law fraud and attempted 
theft by deception, the trial court failed to comply with rule 15(b). Furthermore, our case law requires that the trial 
court instruct the jury on each party's theory of the case so long as it is supported by competent evidence. See, e.g., 
Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977); Pacific Chromalox Div. v. Irey, 787 P.2d 
1319, 1328 (Utah Ct.App.l990).")(Emphasis added). 
Sharpe and Sumerset also make a lengthy argument that UTCO maintains a case can never be dismissed once 
presented to a jury. Defendants' Brief at 24-25. However, that is not the case. UTCO simply argued that the 
Court's basis for failing to instruct the jury was erroneous. UTCO's Brief at 11-20. 
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Defendants' Brief at 28-31. Further, defendants argue that the only reason why UTCO wanted to 
present such evidence was to show a "technical violation of the hull identification statute", 
Defendants' Brief at 27, n. 15 and that such evidence is inadmissible under Rule 402, Utah Rules 
of Evidence.9 
UTCO submits that a violation of a statute is a basis which the jury may properly consider 
when determining whether the defendants' acts are fraudulent, but that was not the only reason 
UTCO wanted to present such evidence. UTCO was entitled to show that defendants reassigned the 
serial numbers to hide the fraud alleged by UTCO. As noted by this Court, "[a] Court may look to 
all of the surrounding facts and circumstances and a continuing pattern of wrongful behavior is one 
indicator of fraudulent intent." Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)(emphasis 
added)(internal quotation and citation omitted); S££ als£ Bails v. Car, 558 P.2d 458 (Mont. 1976) 
(holding that fraudulent intent must be determined in light of all surrounding circumstances); 
Ledbetter v. Webb, 711 P.2d 874 (N.M. 1985) (holding that facts and circumstances surrounding a 
transaction may provide clear and convincing evidence of fraudulent intent). In Selvage v. J.J. 
Johnson & Assoc, 910 P.2d 1252, 1262 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), this Court stated, "The existence of 
fraudulent intent is a factual question, which may be inferred from all of the attendant circumstances. 
It necessarily involves weighing the evidence presented and assessing the credibility of witnesses-
It is also interesting to note that Sharpe claims in the initial portion of his brief: "No serial numbers were altered 
or changed", Defendants' Brief at 13 and 31, and yet in the latter portion of his brief Sharpe admits that he did 
"merely a reassignment on paper of a serial number to avoid a gap in serial numbers." Defendants' Brief at 31. 
UTCO submits that alteration and change of a serial number by Sharpe has been admitted although Sharpe prefers 
to call it a "reassignment." 
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tasks largely within the province of the fact-finder." 
Sharpe and Sumerset argued at trial that UTCO's evidence regarding the change of serial 
numbers was not relevant because the assignment of the serial number to a different boat and the sale 
of that boat occurred three months after the transaction with UTCO.11 However, subsequent conduct 
supports an inference of prior intent not to fulfill a promise or representation. S»££, £*£u, Miller v. 
National Am. Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal. App. 3d 331, 126 Cal. Rptr. 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). Indeed, 
as noted by one Court, f,[s]ince fraud is usually denied, it must be inferred from all facts and 
circumstances . . . including subsequent conduct." Garden State Standardbred Sales Co. Inc. v. 
&££&£, 611 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (emphasis added). 
Defendants also allege that evidence of changing the serial numbers was excluded or should 
have been excluded under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Under Utah law, " f[a]n erroneous 
decision to admit or exclude evidence does not constitute reversible error unless the error is 
harmful.'" Jouflas v, Fox Television Stations, Inc., 927 P.2d 170, 173 (Utah 1996) (quoting Cal 
Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995)). Harmful error occurs 
wCiting In re Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); State v. Delaney, 869 P.2d 4, 6 (Utah App. 1994); 
State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037, 1040 n. 4 (Utah App. 1993), affd, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995); State v. Garrett, 
849 P.2d 578, 582 (Utah App.), cert denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
1
 defendants cite State v. Winward. 909 P.2d 909, 913 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) for the proposition that "fraud 
allegations are subject to the evidentiary requirements and limitations set forth in the Utah Rules of Evidence as are 
all other claims." Defendants' Brief at 26-27; 31-32. However, in Winward this Court was deciding an issue in a 
criminal forgery case. Further, the Court found that the trial "court erred in allowing the State to present evidence 
suggesting defendant had committed wrongful acts against the Bauers, Bassett, ERA Realty, and Mountain America 
Credit Union, apparently on the assumption that the State would ultimately be able to establish that those persons 
and/or entities had actually been defrauded and that these frauds had been somehow accomplished by defendant's 
forgery of a check made payable to someone else." Winward, 909 P.2d at 913. In the present case, the acts of 
defendants would prove the fraud perpetrated against UTCO directly, not some third party. Winward is therefore 
inapposite. 
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where "the likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of the error is 'sufficiently high so as to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.' "Id. at 174 (quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987)). In this case, the following evidence was admitted: 
1) The Houseboat Sharpe promised to deliver was never constructed by Sumerset; R. 
565,643,2097-98; 
2) The Houseboat at issue did not exist on the date Sharpe received $58,384 from UTCO 
even though Sharpe promised to send the Houseboat after receiving the Funds, R. 565,643,2097-98; 
3) A Houseboat matching the MSO and invoice which Sharpe sent to UTCO was never 
constructed, R. 565, 643, 2097-98; 
4) The Houseboat represented in the MSO and invoice sent to UTCO never existed, R. 
2097-98; 
5) The Houseboat with the serial number on invoice and MSO sent to UTCO was sold 
to someone else, R.2211. 
While UTCO believes the presented evidence was compelling, evidence of the change of serial 
numbers should had been presented to the jury, as it constituted additional evidence from which the 
jury would have found that Sharpe had the fraudulent intent necessary to support UTCO's claims 
for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Indeed, preclusion of evidence from which Sharpe's fraud 
may be inferred creates prejudicial harm to UTCO. Confidence in the jury verdict must be 
questioned because of the exclusion of evidence of Sharpe's fraud, and because the outcome of the 
trial would have been different. 
In sum, evidence that Sharpe and Sumerset reassigned the serial number for the Houseboat 
- 1 3 -
shown on the MSO they sent to Nelson to a different houseboat and then subsequently sold the 
second houseboat is relevant to UTCO's fraud claim, specifically on the issue of fraudulent intent. 
The fact that this conduct occurred three or four months after Sharpe and Sumerset attempted to void 
their transaction with Zimmerman and UTCO does not in any way diminish the relevance of that 
evidence. The trial court erroneously granted defendants' motion in limine and UTCO is entitled 
to a new trial on its claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. 
CONCLUSION 
After more than two years of litigation and without stating any sufficient grounds therefor, 
the trial court improperly dismissed plaintiffs claim for promissory estoppel at the close of the 
evidence and erroneously excluded evidence regarding reassignment of serial number for the 
houseboat on the first day of trial. UTCO's claim for promissory estoppel is a legal claim which was 
not "surplusage" to UTCO's claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. 
Alternatively, if this Court rules that UTCO's promissory estoppel claim is equitable in nature, 
UTCO did not have an adequate remedy at law which precluded submission of the promissory 
estoppel claim to the jury. Further, the trial court's exclusion of evidence from which fraudulent 
intent must be inferred constitutes prejudicial error which warrants reversal of the dismissal of 
UTCO's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiff prays that the judgment of the 
trial court be vacated and that this action be remanded for a new trial on plaintiffs causes of action 
for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, punitive damages, and breach of 
contract. 
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DATED this 27th day of February, 1998. 
DURHAM, EVANS, JONES & PINEGAR 
M 
M. Jones 
' Mark Gibb 
'Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27th day of February, 1998,1 caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed in the U.S. Mail, first-class, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Blake S. Atkin 
Jonathan L. Hawkins 
ATKIN & LILJA 
136 South Main Street, #810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
- 1 5 -
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970229-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OR USE 
OF METHAMPHETAMINE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (1) 1953 AS AMENDED, IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
RANDALL K. SPENCER (6992) 
Utah County Public Defenders 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84 601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
Counsel for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
vs. 
LISA DEHERRERA, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 970229-CA 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OR USE 
OF METHAMPHETAMINE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § § 58-37-
8(2)(a)(1) 1953 AS AMENDED, IN THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING, PRESIDING. 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Counsel for Appellee 
RANDALL K. SPENCER (6992) 
Utah County Public Defenders 
245 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
Counsel for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
POINT I 
THE STATE CONCEDED THAT DEPUTY SHIVERDECKER CONDUCTED AN 
UNLAWFUL TERRY FRISK OF DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION . . 1 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CHALLENGES TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE 2 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE LEON 
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE 
PRESENT CASE 3 
POINT IV 
THE UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH 5 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
ARTICULATE A POLICY-BASED REASON TO CONSIDER AN 
INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND TO 
THEREBY REJECT THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION 8 
POINT VI 
BECAUSE UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NEVER RECOGNIZED A 
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE PURSUANT TO 
ARTICLE I, § 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING SHOULD BE REVERSED 9 
POINT VII 
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD 
NOT BE ADOPTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, §14 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 10 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 11 
i 
TABLE OP AUTHORITIES 
Caaes Cited 
Illinois v. Krull. 480 U.S. 340 (1987) 3, 4, 5, 10, 11 
Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493 (1958) 6 
Katz v. United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) 6 
Michigan v. Sitz.496 U.S. 444 (1990) 8 
People v. Krueaer. 675 N.E.2d 604 (111. 1996) 11 
Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) 2 
State in Interest of A.R.. 937 P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1997) . . . . 6 
State v. Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996) 10 
State v. Barella. 714 P.2d 287 (Utah 1986) 7 
State v, Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995) 7 
State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992) 6 
State v. Carter. 812 P.2d 460 (Utah 1991) . 2 
State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995) 9 
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987) 2 
State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431(Utah 1993) 9 
State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781 (Utah 1992) 7 
State v. Larocco. 294 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 9 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 9 
State v. Rochell. 850 P. 2d 480 (Utah App. 1993) 2 
State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) 9 
State v. Roybal. 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) 6 
State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) 10 
State v. Wells. 928 P.2d 386 (Utah App. 1996) 6 
Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 2, 6 
ii 
United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984) . . . . 3, 4, 7, 10, 11 
Wickham v. Fisher. 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981) 2 
Constitutional Provisions. Statutes and Rules 
Utah Constitution, Article I, §14 3, 8, 9, 10 
Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act, Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-
23-101 thru 77-23-105 (1953 as amended) 2, 3 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee : Case No. 970229-CA 
vs. : 
LISA DEHERRERA, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant : 
ARgVMSNT 
POINT I 
THE STATE CONCEDED THAT DEPUTY SHIVERDECKER CONDUCTED AN 
UNLAWFUL TERRY FRISK OF DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The only argument in Appellee's brief responding to 
Appellant's contention that the Terry frisk was not supported by 
reasonable suspicion is a footnote. Appellee's Br. at 3, n.l. The 
State argues that the issue of the unlawful Terry search of 
Appellant's person is not properly preserved for appeal. Id. 
However, implicit in Defendant's preservation of the illegal 
actions of the Utah County Sheriff's Office at the roadblock in 
question is the preservation of the issue relating to the unlawful 
search of Appellant at the roadblock. (R. 41-82, 113, 118-119). 
The State did not factually dispute the unlawful Terry search of 
Appellant, and thereby, conceded to Appellant's arguments on this 
point. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
denial of Appellant's motion to suppress on the basis that 
regardless of whether she was legally stopped, Deputy Shiverdecker 
did not have reasonable suspicion that Appellant posed a danger to 
1 
officer safety which would justify a Terry frisk, ana that the 
scope of Deputy Shiverdecker's search of Appellant exceeded the 
scope of a Terry frisk. See Appellantfs Br. at 41-45 (citing: Terry 
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); State V. RQChell, 850 P.2d 480 (Utah 
App. 1993) :State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah 1991); State V, 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)). 
POINT II 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER APPELLANT'S CHALLENGES TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHECKPOINT STATUTE. 
Additionally, the State argues in its brief that this Court 
should not address Appellant's challenges to the constitutionality 
of the Administrative Traffic Checkpoint Act (Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 77-23-101 thru 77-23-105 (1953 as amended)), hereinafter ATCA. 
Appellee's Br. at 11-12. However, if this Court were to accept the 
State's assertion, the constitutionality of ATCA would perhaps 
forever evade constitutional challenge. The State argues: "On 
appeal, the State does challenge the court's ruling on the plan's 
unconstitutional noncompliance with the statute. The issue of good 
faith is independent of the statute's constitutionality and 
determines the outcome of the case." Appellee's Br. at 12 (emphasis 
added). Thus, pursuant to the State's argument, the 
constitutionality of ATCA will essentially never be ripe for 
review, because the issue will always be able to be decided on a 
good faith analysis. Appellant asserts that the constitutional 
issue in the case at bar is similar to the circumstance where 
appellate courts address issues which are technically moot, but the 
issue will likely recur, and is capable of evading review. Wickham 
v. Fisher/ 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981); £££ alSQ Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 
2 
113 (1973). Therefore, Appellant requests this Court to review the 
constitionality of ATCA under the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution^ 
Additionally, because at the present time, neither the Utah 
Supreme Court nor the Utah Legislature has adopted the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule, this Court must at least review 
the constitutionality of ATCA under Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Where the good faith exception to the warrant 
requirement does not presently exist under Article I, § 14, the 
only means of resolution of the issues before this Court require a 
constitutional analysis of ATCA pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
PQINT XXX 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT CONCLUDED THAT THE LEON GOOD 
FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT 
CASE. 
In Appellee's brief, the State ultimately conceded that the 
Leon rUnited States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)] good faith 
exception does not apply to the present case: "While Leon expressly 
limited that decision to the good faith execution of judicially 
authorized searches only, its rationale has been more fully 
developed in Illinois vT Krull ("Illinois v. Krull. 480 U.S. 340 
(1987)]." Appellee's Br. at 15. In the present case, it is 
undisputed that the officers did not stop and search defendant 
pursuant to a warrant supported by judicial determination of 
probable cause. Thus, the only possible argument that the good 
faith exception applied to the facts of the present case, is 
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according to the expanded good faith exception pursuant to the 
holding in Krull, 480 U.S. 340. 
However, upon careful review, this court should determine that 
even the expanded good faith exception in Krull does not salvage 
the conduct of law enforcement personnel in the present case. The 
holding in Krull addressed the following issue: 
[W]hether a similar exception [to the Leon exception] to 
the exclusionary rule should be recognized when officers 
act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute 
authorizing warrantless administrative searches, but 
where the statute is ultimately found to violate the 
Fourth Amendment." 
ftOlll, 480 U.S. at 342. The majority of the Court in Krull 
ultimately held that although the statute in question was held to 
be unconstitutional, the officer "relied, in objective good faith, 
on a statute that appeared legitimately to allow a warrantless 
administrative search of respondents' business." Id. at 360. The 
present case is distinguishable from Krull in at least two 
significant points: (1) in the present case, the trial court found 
that the officers did not follow the requirements of the statute in 
question providing for administrative traffic checkpoints; (R. at 
106, 107) and (2) the statute at issue, ATCA, has not yet been 
found to be unconstitutional. In order for the extended good faith 
exception as created by Krull to apply, officers must follow the 
requirements of the statute on which they purport to justify their 
actions. Krull. 480 U.S. at 349. Furthermore, the statute must 
subsequently be deemed unconstitutional, or the necessity for an 
expanded good faith exception would never arise. Id. at 360. 
Therefore, as the State conceded, the good faith exception as 
created in Lssn, 468 U.S. 897 does not apply to the facts of the 
4 
present case, and as discussed above, the expanded good faith 
exception pursuant to Krull, 480 U.S. 340 is also inapplicable. 
The trial court's holding that the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule pursuant to the Fourth Amendment applies to the 
facts of the present case was not correct, and this court should 
reverse the trial court's ruling and remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
Furthermore, as the State conceded in its brief, the court in 
Krull "noted that the good faith exception might not apply if an 
officer erroneously, although in good faith, acted outside the 
scope of a statute." Appellee's Br. at 18 (citing: Krull, 480 U.S. 
at 360 n.17). Thus, even if the Court were to agree with the State 
that the Krull good faith exception applies to the facts of the 
present case, the fact that the trial court held that the officer's 
actions, even if they were in good faith, were outside the scope of 
the statute. (R. 106, 107). In other words, even if the Utah 
County Sheriff's Officers acted in good faith reliance on the 
magistrate's approval of their roadblock plan, the trial court 
still determined that their actions were not in conformity with 
ATCA (R. 106, 107), and therefore, the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule does not apply. 
POINT XV 
THE UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE AND THE UTAH COUNTY 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH 
The State would have this Court find that substantial good 
faith is enough good faith for the good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule to apply. (Appellee's Br. at 19-29). However, 
circumstances which "almost" satisfy an exception to the warrant 
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requirement is wholly inadequate to overcome the per se 
unreasonableness of warrantless searches. State v. Wells, 928 P. 2d 
386 (Utah App. 1996); State v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851 (Utah 1992); and 
KfltZ V, United States. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Exceptions to the 
warrant requirement are narrowly drawn. See Terry v. Ohio, 3 92 U.S. 
1 (1968); State v. Roybal. 716 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986). The United 
States Supreme Court stated, "[t]he exceptions to the rule that a 
search must rest upon a search warrant have been jealously and 
carefully drawn." Jones v. United States. 357 U.S. 493 (1958). 
In State in Interest of A.R.. 937 P.2d 1037 (Utah App. 1997), 
this Court stated that the good faith exception is one of the 
limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. Id. at 1044 n.7. 
The State's assertion that substantial good faith is sufficient to 
qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement and the 
application of the exclusionary rule is completely contrary to the 
narrowly, carefully, and jealously carved exceptions to the 
requirement that officers obtain a warrant prior to stopping and 
seizing people in our country. 
Furthermore, the mere substantial compliance with the 
requirements of ATCA was due to the choice of the Utah County 
Sheriff's Office and the Utah County Attorney's Office. The 
original roadblock plan submitted to the magistrate by the Utah 
County Attorney's Office and the Utah County Sheriff's Office only 
partially complied with the requirements of ATCA. (SR. 1-39) . 
However, even the degree of partial compliance with ATCA decreased 
over the period of years in which the original plan was amended 
numerous times until the amendment which was in effect at the time 
Appellant was stopped at the roadblock. (SR. 53-79). The fact that 
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the Utah County Sheriff's Office and Utah County Attorney's Office 
were able to get magistrates to rubber-stamp the original roadblock 
plan together with numerous amendments which only partially 
complied with ATCA does not justify application of the good faith 
exception. Lesn, 468 U.S. 919 n.20; £EILLL, 480 U.S. at 355. 
Where the Utah County Sheriff's Office and Utah County 
Attorney's Office invited the magistrates to erroneously rubber-
stamp roadblock plans which only partially complied with ATCA, they 
cannot now claim that they acted in good faith because the 
magistrate accepted their invitation to approve a plan based only 
on partial compliance. It is incongruent and inherent bad faith on 
the part of the Utah County Attorney's Office and Utah County 
Sheriff's Office to invite error on the part of a magistrate, and 
subsequently, claim that they reasonably relied on the magistrate's 
finding that the roadblock plan was sufficient under ATCA even 
though it only partially complied with ATCA's requirements. This 
Court should not permit the State to rely on invited error. State 
v. Blubaugh. 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah App. 1995); State v. Emmett, 
839 P.2d 781, 788 (Utah 1992); State v. Barella. 714 P.2d 287, 2$8 
(Utah 1986). 
Even if the State's compliance with ATCA rises to the level of 
substantial rather than simply partial compliance, it is not 
sufficient to justify the finding that the good faith exception to 
the warrant requirement is applicable, and this Court should 
reverse the trial court's finding of good faith. 
Addit ionally, the trial court specifically found that the 
actions of the Utah County Sheriff personnel operating the 
roadblock in question exceeded the scope of permissible roadblocks 
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as articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Michigan v. Sitz.496 
U.S. 444 (1990). (R. 106-107). Thus, under the objective 
reasonable officer standard of good faith, the officers in the 
present case either knew or should have known that the roadblock 
which they were conducting far exceeded the brief detention and 
inquiry to look for signs of impairment authorized in fijjfci. Id. at 
447-55. This Court should not find that the Utah County Sheriff's 
Office acted in good faith in conducting the roadblock in question. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO 
ARTICULATE A POLICY-BASED REASON TO CONSIDER AN INDEPENDENT 
ANALYSIS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION AND TO THEREBY REJECT 
THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION• 
The State argues in its brief that because the trial court did 
not address the state constitutional arguments made by Appellant, 
"the trial court implicitly concluded that defendant failed to 
articulate a policy-based reason to depart from federal law, and, 
thus, properly refused to construe a good faith exception to the 
state exclusionary rule different from the federal good faith 
exception." Appellee's Br. at 30. The State's argument is wild 
speculation. If any conclusion were to be drawn by the trial 
court's silence on Appellant's arguments relative to a separate 
analysis pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution from 
the analysis pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, such a conclusion 
would be that the trial court considered the independent State 
constitutional analysis and determined that although the analysis 
is separate and distinct, the result is the same. Appellant 
maintains that the arguments made before the trial court and in 
Appellant's Brief asserting a separate and distinct analysis of the 
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roadblock issues pursuant to Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution should be reviewed by this Court for correctness. 
State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). If this Court is 
reluctant to review Appellant's arguments pursuant to Article I, § 
14, then Appellant would request that this issue be remanded to the 
trial court for further findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
BECAUSE UTAH APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NEVER RECOGNIZED A GOOD 
FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 
I, § 14 OP THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
SHOULD BE REVERSED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has never recognized a good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule pursuant to Article I, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution. State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 
1991), rev'd in part. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah 1992); State v, hZXQQQQ, 
294 P.2d 460, 473(Utah 1990); State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181, 187 
(Utah 1987) (Zimmerman, J., concurring). The State cites cases 
such as State v. Chapman. 921 P.2d 446 (Utah 1995) in an attempt to 
argue that Utah appellate courts have adopted the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule. However, Chapman, and all 
other cases in Utah which have affirmatively applied a good faith 
analysis, have done so pursuant to a Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Appellant is unaware of any case in Utah which has addressed the 
good faith exception pursuant to Article I, §14 of the Utah 
Constitution. Therefore, at the present time, there is no good 
faith exception to exclusion of evidence when a police officer's 
violates a person's rights under Article I, §14. 
The State argues in its brief, "Indeed, this Court, as an 
intermediate court of appeals, is not even the proper forum to 
9 
decide whether Utah lacks a good faith exception comparable to the 
federal exception. . . . " Appellee's Br. at 34. Because there 
presently does not exist a good faith exception under Article I, 
§14 of the Utah Constitution, and the State concedes that this 
Court is not the proper forum to create such an exception, then the 
trial court is certainly not the forum to create a good faith 
exception under Article I, §14. Therefore, the trial court erred 
in not granting Appellant's motion to suppress based on the fact 
that the trial court clearly found that the officer's actions in 
the present case were unconstitutional (R. 6-7), and absent a good 
faith exception pursuant to Article I, §14 exclusion of the 
evidence is the only proper remedy. State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 
(Utah 1991). 
POINT VII 
A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE SHOULD NOT BE 
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO ARTICLE I, §14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
In State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, ". . .Utah courts should construe article I, 
§14 in a manner similar to constructions of the Fourth Amendment 
except in compelling circumstances." Id. at 1235. According to the 
arguments in Appellant's Brief, Appellant asserts that both the 
good faith exceptions pursuant to Leon, 468 U.S. 897 and Krull, 480 
U.S. 340 present the type of compelling circumstances which justify 
Utah Courts in diverging from Fourth Amendment analysis and 
resorting to the State Constitution as approximately 14 other 
states have done in striking down the good faith exception under 
its respective state constitution. 
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Additionally, at least one State, Illinois, while accepting 
the good faith exception pursuant to Lean, 468 U.S. 897, declined 
to accept the expanded good faith exception pursuant to KEILLI, 480 
U.S. 340 (more state's are almost certain to follow): 
We are not willing to recognize an exception to our state 
exclusionary rule that will provide a grace period for 
unconstitutional search and seizure legislation, during 
which time our citizens' prized constitutional rights can 
be violated with impunity. We are particularly disturbed 
by the fact that such a grace period could last for 
several years and affect large numbers of people. This 
is simply too high a price for our citizens to pay. We 
therefore conclude that article I, section 6, of the 
Illinois Constitution of 1970 prohibits the application 
of Krull's extended good-faith exception to our state 
exclusionary rule. 
[W] e note that our decision today does not impact the 
Leon good-faith exception. . . .[0]ne can fully accept 
the rationale and result in Leon while rejecting the 
rationale and result in Krull. This is precisely what 
Justice O'Connor did in her dissent in Krull. 
People v. Krueaer, 675 N.E.2d 604 (111. 1996). 
Due to the compelling circumstances relative to the good faith 
exception and the confusion that is created when reviewing courts 
I 
are forced to "entertain the mind-boggling concept of objectively 
reasonable reliance upon an objectively unreasonable warrant," 
Leon, 468 U.S. at 959 (Brennan J., dissenting) Utah Appellate 
courts should decline to adopt the good faith exceptions created in 
Leon. 468 U.S. 897 and Krull. 480 U.S. 340. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For all of the reasons set forth in Appellant's Brief and 
Appellant's Reply Brief, this court should reverse the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and remand this 
case to the Fourth District Court with directions to suppress the 
evidence and dismiss the charge. 
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Respectfully submitted this 20th day of January, 1998 
(andall K. Spenper 
Attorney for Deherrera 
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